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INTRODUCTION
Marcus was poor, he was African American, and he seemed to
suffer from mental health issues.1 One day, he walked into a major
* © 2019 William O. Walker.
1. “Marcus” is the fictitious name of a real client the author helped represent during
a summer internship at a North Carolina public defender’s office. Other minor details are
altered to protect the client’s identity. This account is taken from his arrest warrant and his
client intake interview.
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retailer and decided to put several packs of playing cards into his
backpack. After placing the merchandise in his bag, Marcus headed
for the door. Just as he stepped into the parking lot, however, he was
stopped by one of the store’s security officers. During an interview,
Marcus told me that as soon as the officer confronted him about
taking the cards, he admitted to the act and handed over the
merchandise. Still, the security officer called the police and kept
Marcus on the premises until they arrived. Marcus was arrested,
jailed, unable to post any bail, and indicted on one count of habitual
misdemeanor larceny. The indictment charged him with stealing
fourteen packs of cards valued at $60, though Marcus maintained that
it was only four packs.
Assuming the indictment was accurate, Marcus committed the
larceny of $60 in playing cards. Normally, this crime would qualify as
misdemeanor larceny, a penalty carrying a maximum, but unlikely,
sentence of 120 days incarceration.2 In Marcus’s case, however, the
act of stealing several packs of game cards was charged as a Class H
felony because Marcus had four prior convictions or guilty pleas for
misdemeanor larceny. Therefore, his latest offense brought him under
North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor larceny statute.3
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-72(a), 15A-1340.23(c)(2) (2017). A resolution to Marcus’s
case was put on hold as he underwent a mental health screening. Ordinarily, it would have
been unlikely for Marcus’s case to proceed to trial and result in the maximum punishment
of a Class H felony. Instead, a plea deal to a misdemeanor would be the typical result. As
will be discussed below, even at trial, judges can impose relatively light felony sentences,
but they cannot remove the felon designation if the jury returns a guilty verdict on a
habitual misdemeanor larceny count. See infra Part III.
3. See id. § 14-72(a)–(b)(6). The pertinent part of the statute reads as follows:
(a) Larceny of goods of the value of more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) is a
Class H felony. . . . Larceny as provided in subsection (b) of this section is a Class
H felony. . . .
(b) The crime of larceny is a felony, without regard to the value of the property in
question, if the larceny is any of the following:
...
(6) Committed after the defendant has been convicted in this State or in
another jurisdiction for any offense of larceny under this section, or any
offense deemed or punishable as larceny under this section, or of any
substantially similar offense in any other jurisdiction, regardless of whether
the prior convictions were misdemeanors, felonies, or a combination
thereof, at least four times. A conviction shall not be included in the four
prior convictions required under this subdivision unless the defendant was
represented by counsel or waived counsel at first appearance or otherwise
prior to trial or plea. If a person is convicted of more than one offense of
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In North Carolina, it is a Class H felony to commit larceny where
the property in question is not more than $1000 and the defendant
has four prior larceny convictions.4 Without the previous convictions,
larceny of property totaling not more than $1000 would otherwise be
a Class 1 misdemeanor with a worst-case punishment of 120 days
incarceration.5 A Class H felony, on the other hand, carries a
potential active sentence of thirty-three months and lifetime branding
as a “felon.”6 In Marcus’s case, because of his prior larceny
convictions, stealing $60 worth of playing cards could result in the
severe Class H felony punishment.
Increasing criminal penalties for recidivists is not a novel
concept. Blackstone noted it was a “heavy misdemeanor” to defend
the Pope’s power within England; the second time, however, it was
“high treason.”7 The American colonies utilized some early forms of
recidivist statutes. For example, the Massachusetts Bay Colony
punished repeat burglars more seriously than first-time offenders, and
the colony of Virginia punished “repeat hog stealers” more harshly
than neophytes.8 The use of recidivist statutes continued after the

misdemeanor larceny in a single session of district court, or in a single
week of superior court or of a court in another jurisdiction, only one of the
convictions may be used as a prior conviction under this subdivision;
except that convictions based upon offenses which occurred in separate
counties shall each count as a separate prior conviction under this
subdivision.
Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. §§ 14-72(a), 15A-1340.23(c)(2).
6. Id. § 15A-1340.17(c)–(d). This sentence length assumes the highest prior
conviction record and aggravating factors and is determined by using the chart included
within the statute. First, enter the chart on the left at felony level H. Id. § 15A-1340.17(c).
Next, move to the right until reaching the appropriate “Prior Record Level” column. Id.
Within that box are three ranges: mitigated (the lowest), presumptive (middle), and
aggravated (highest). Id. The aggravated range for a Class H felony with the highest prior
record level is 20–25. Id. Next, take the highest number in that range, 25, and move to the
“Minimum and Maximum Sentences” chart that follows the main sentencing chart. Id.
§ 15A-1340.17(d). Locate 25 in the chart labeled “For Offenses Class F Through I” and
read the available range (25–39). Id. Without aggravating factors, but still with the highest
prior record level, the maximum active sentence allowed is 20–33 months. Id. A
presumptive range with a prior record level of III could still include a sentence of 10–21
months. Id.
7. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *87. Blackstone also states in his
introduction that the worst punishments “ought never to be inflicted, but when the
offender appears incorrigible: which may be collected . . . from a repetition of minuter
offences.” Id. at *12 (emphasis added).
8. Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Double Jeopardy as a Limit on
Punishment, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 52–53 (2011).
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Constitutional Convention, but it was not until the early twentieth
century that such statutes became commonplace.9
North Carolina has habitual statutes for misdemeanor assault,10
driving while intoxicated (“DWI”),11 and, since 2012, misdemeanor
larceny.12 All of these provisions use a defendant’s prior misdemeanor
record to significantly increase the level of punishment prosecutors
may seek and, most devastatingly, impose felon status upon
defendants. As the historical tradition suggests, North Carolina is not
alone in its use of recidivist statutes.13 In fact, all fifty states and the
federal government have enacted some type of recidivist provision.14
Notably, North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor larceny statute uses
prior larceny offenses—misdemeanor or felony—as the only factor
needed to apply felony sanctions.15
Though recidivism statutes come with a historical pedigree, they
also come with costs that demand an objective examination of their
benefits and worth. Arguably, this demand is even greater for
misdemeanors, where the harms and threats to society are less
significant than for felonies.16 This is especially true with
misdemeanor larceny in North Carolina, where the value of the
property taken is not more than $1000.17
This Comment examines North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor
larceny statute. After comparing the costs of creating more felons and
giving longer prison sentences with the supposed benefits of increased
punishments for those who habitually steal $1000 or less in property,
it concludes that the benefits do not justify the costs. North Carolina’s
9. Id. at 53; see also Michael G. Turner et al., “Three Strikes and You’re Out”
Legislation: A National Assessment, 59 FED. PROB. 16, 17 (1995) (noting that several states
in the 1920s became enthusiastic about the prospect of harsh sentences targeted at
habitual felons).
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33.2 (2017).
11. Id. § 20-138.5.
12. Id. § 14-72(b)(6).
13. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(6) (LEXIS through 2018 SLA, all legis.)
(“[The offense is a Class C felony if] the value of the property, adjusted for inflation as
provided in AS 11.46.982, is $250 or more but less than $750 and, within the preceding five
years, the person has been convicted and sentenced on two or more separate occasions in
this or another jurisdiction . . . .”).
14. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26–27 (1992) (noting this fact and mentioning other
cases).
15. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72(a)–(b)(6) (2017); Andrew Katbi, Note, Crossing the
Line: An Analysis of Problems with Classifying Recidivist Misdemeanor Offenses as
Felonies, 31 ALASKA L. REV. 105, 123 (2014) (discussing the use of felony charges on the
sole basis of prior misdemeanor offenses).
16. See Katbi, supra note 15, at 111–13.
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72(a) (2017).
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habitual misdemeanor larceny statute comes with a lot of squeeze: the
cost to the state of prosecuting and imprisoning more felons, the
societal costs of creating more felons, and the individual costs to
offenders with felon status. Punishing petty larceny recidivists as
felons with slightly longer prison sentences comes with a significant
cost and negligibly serves the alleged benefits of the law—deterrence
and prevention. In fact, some research suggests longer prison
sentences may take minor criminals and turn them into violent
offenders.18 With the uncertain efficacy and possibly deleterious
effects of longer sentences in the misdemeanor larceny context, it is
important to explore other punishment options that are more cost
effective and avoid the long-term consequences of felon status.
The argument proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the
“squeeze” created by costs to the state, society, and the individual.
Part II explores the “juice” the statute seeks to yield by examining the
deterrence effect of increased punishment for misdemeanor larceny
recidivists and possible criminogenic effects of longer prison
sentences for minor offenders. Finally, Part III reaches the conclusion
that a law with such high costs and so little yield is not worth the
squeeze to get the juice, but offers possible alternative solutions to
North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor larceny statute.
I. THE “SQUEEZE”: THE COST OF CREATING MORE FELONS
Creating more felons comes with fiscal costs, societal costs, and
individual costs. Of course, the costs of the law depend very heavily
on the decisions of a key player in the North Carolina criminal justice
system: the prosecutor. It is the prosecutor who decides what charges
to seek and what laws to use in administering criminal justice.19
Indeed, there is research showing that prosecutors are reluctant to use
newer laws.20 Regardless of this variable’s effect, however, the
potential costs are great, and the actual costs, when the law is used,
demand evaluation. The North Carolina General Assembly, however,
18. JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, HOW MANY AMERICANS
ARE UNNECESSARILY INCARCERATED? 21 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/
publication/how-many-americans-are-unnecessarily-incarcerated [https://perma.cc/HRL6PFQM]; see also infra Section II.C.
19. See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 193 N.C. App. 236, 238, 666 S.E.2d 880, 883 (2008)
(noting that a prosecutor “has discretion” to prosecute a defendant as a habitual felon
when the defendant has three prior felony convictions).
20. See Jeff Welty, Overcriminalization in North Carolina, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1935, 1950
(2014) (“As it turns out, North Carolina has many new laws that are rarely used. In fact,
data collected by the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts reveal that in
North Carolina, most new crimes are effectively dead letters from the beginning.”).
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seemingly failed to thoroughly conduct this evaluation when it first
contemplated the habitual misdemeanor larceny statute.
A. Legislative Genesis: Rushing to Judgment
Though creating an entirely new group of felons is a significant
choice, the legislature appears to have made the decision to do so
without any meaningful consideration of habitual misdemeanor
larceny’s costs. Scant information exists about the initial impetus to
pass a habitual misdemeanor larceny statute, but there is evidence
that it came about at the urging of law enforcement officials. One
news story cites Henderson, North Carolina, police officers as
advocating for a recidivist larceny law similar to one that exists in
Virginia.21 Indeed, it was the Democratic representative for
Henderson, North Carolina, who introduced and sponsored the
original version of the bill in the North Carolina House of
Representatives.22 Police preference for such a law again dominated
the Senate Judiciary II Committee meeting that discussed the
proposed habitual misdemeanor larceny provision.23
The North Carolina General Assembly passed the habitual
misdemeanor larceny statute during the 2011–2012 legislative
session.24 At the initial House committee meeting, the only expert
recorded as having spoken was a representative from the North
Carolina Retail Merchants Association.25 One committee member,
Representative Bryant, appears to have discussed “best practices in
loss control,” but there are no other recorded comments challenging
the efficacy of greater punishments for misdemeanor larceny
recidivists.26 At the end of the meeting, the committee opened the
floor to public comment, but no comments were made.27 A Bill
21. Beau Minnick, Henderson Police Want Tougher Law for Habitual Thieves,
WRAL (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/9015971/ [https://perma.cc/
J427-3K2N].
22. An Act to Create the Status Offense of Habitual Misdemeanor Larceny: Hearing on
H.B. 54 Before the H. Judiciary Subcomm. B, 2011 Gen. Assemb., 2011–2012 Sess. (N.C.
Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Feb. 23 H. Judiciary Subcomm. Hearing] (agenda and minutes
of the Feb. 23, 2011, hearing).
23. An Act to Create the Status Offense of Habitual Misdemeanor Larceny: Hearing on
H.B. 54 Before the S. Judiciary II Comm., 2012 Gen. Assemb., 2011–2012 Sess. (N.C. May
22, 2012) [hereinafter May 22 S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing] (minutes and notes of the May
22, 2012, hearing).
24. Act of Dec. 1, 2012, ch. 90, § 1, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 737, 738 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-72(b)(6) (2017)).
25. See Feb. 23 H. Judiciary Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 22.
26. See id.
27. See id.
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substitute was reported favorably out of the House Judiciary
Subcommittee B at the next meeting on March 9, 2011;28 the version
reported out of committee originally required seven prior
misdemeanor larceny convictions before felon status could be
charged.29
Following approval in the House, the Senate Judiciary II
Committee took up discussion of the proposed law.30 Legislative
research staff attended the hearing to answer questions posed by
senators, but no opposition to the bill was recorded in the committee
minutes.31 Other than legislative research staff, the only other outside
representative to speak was the general counsel for the North
Carolina Chiefs of Police.32 As he put it, “the police have wanted
something like this [law] for a long time.”33 Though there were
representatives from both the North Carolina Advocates for Justice
and the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts present
during the hearing, the minutes recorded no comments from the
general public.34 With apparently limited opposition raised against the
Bill, the Senate Judiciary II Committee recommended the law be
amended to reduce the number of predicate offenses to four, meaning
the fifth offense would bring a defendant under the statute’s habitual
provision.35
Thus, a new class of felons was born with only the barest of
consideration for the costs and virtually no opposition to the law.
Though the legislature considered financial costs, those costs were
never expressly justified on any grounds. North Carolina decided it
needed the squeeze without ever considering what juice it would
receive.
B.

Financial Costs to the State

Reading through committee minutes, it does not appear that
North Carolina’s incipient habitual misdemeanor larceny statute
28. An Act to Create the Status Offense of Habitual Misdemeanor Larceny: Hearing on
H.B. 54 Before the H. Judiciary Subcomm. B, 2011 Gen. Assemb., 2011–2012 Sess. (N.C.
Mar. 9, 2011) [hereinafter Mar. 11 H. Judiciary Subcomm. Hearing] (agenda and minutes
of the Mar. 9, 2011, hearing).
29. H.B. 54, 2011 Gen. Assemb., 2011 Sess. (N.C. 2011) (as proposed by H. Judiciary
Subcomm. B, Feb. 9, 2011).
30. See May 22 S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 23.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.; see also Minnick, supra note 21.
34. May 22 S. Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 23.
35. Id.
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received significant challenges on either policy or empirical grounds.
There was, however, ample concern about the financial realities of
such a law,36 especially given the fiscal attitudes dominating the North
Carolina General Assembly during the 2011–2012 session.37
Before a defendant becomes a convicted felon, who must be
housed by the Department of Public Safety, he or she is a criminal
defendant entitled to legal representation and a fair trial. With the
passing of the new recidivist statute, the North Carolina
Administrative Office of the Courts (“AOC”) predicted a significant
increase in costs to the court system.38 In 2011, the calendar year
immediately preceding the Bill’s passage, there were 42,160 Class 1
misdemeanor larceny charges statewide.39 The AOC estimated a full
24% of those cases (10,118) could have been charged under the new
law as a Class H felony.40 On average, the cost difference between a
Class 1 misdemeanor and a Class H felony is $336 per case, meaning
the difference in the caseload could have cost the court system
$1,387,344 to $3,399,648 in the first full year of implementation,
depending on the rate the new law was used by the state.41 In addition
to these costs for the habitual misdemeanor larceny trial, it was also
possible that defense attorneys would more vigorously contest the
predicate fourth misdemeanor larceny charge.42
Of course, the cost of defending against habitual misdemeanor
larceny charges was possibly tempered by the reluctance of
prosecutors to charge individuals with relatively new crimes.43
Accepting as true the proposition that this reluctance to charge under
36. The statistics in this section are drawn almost entirely from the final version of the
Incarceration Note produced by the North Carolina General Assembly Fiscal Research
Division. See N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY FISCAL RESEARCH DIV., LEGISLATIVE
INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE, H.B. 54, 2011 Gen. Assemb., 2011 Sess., at 5 (2011)
[hereinafter INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE], https://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2011/
FiscalNotes/House/PDF/HIN0054v5.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWH8-NU9L].
37. See Minnick, supra note 21 (“Rep. Jim Crawford, D-Granville, said he hopes to
introduce a bill as early as next week, but lawmakers say funding could be an issue,
especially in times of a state budget crisis.”).
38. INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE, supra note 36, at 2–3 (“This estimate includes
costs for those positions typically involved in felony cases – Superior Court Judge,
Assistant District Attorney, Deputy Clerk, Court Reporter, and Victim Witness/Legal
Assistant – as well as operating and infrastructure costs.”).
39. Id. at 3.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2–3. The North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission noted
“that there were 17,197 misdemeanor larceny convictions in FY 2010–11.” Of these, “they
estimated that 4,129 (24%) have seven or more prior convictions.” Id. at 2.
42. Id. at 3.
43. See Welty, supra note 20, at 1950–51.
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new laws renders those laws “dead letters”44 from the beginning, it is
still true that the threat of such a law hung over every defendant
eligible to be charged. In the context of misdemeanor recidivist
statutes such as this one, people charged with minor misdemeanors
suddenly found themselves facing felony convictions. Such a drastic
increase in the potential punishment meant defense attorneys, even if
they did not end up defending against the enhanced charges outright,
still needed to do extra work to ensure prosecutors did not bring
those charges. This added workload includes longer, more difficult
negotiations between defense attorneys and prosecutors as well as a
more vigorous defense of prior misdemeanor larceny charges as a
defendant approaches the requisite fifth conviction. Therefore, even
though prosecutors might not have used the new law as frequently as
the AOC estimated, it undoubtedly increased the cost of defending
people in court.
Any law that increases the number of incarcerated persons adds
to an already expensive system. The estimated cost for North
Carolina to operate its prison system for 2018–2019 is around $1.2
billion,45 or almost 5% of the state’s roughly $23 billion total
operating budget.46 As another representative study of New York
shows, prisons are one of that state’s most burdensome
expenditures.47 Prison expenditures across the United States became
all the more burdensome as prison populations exploded during the
late twentieth century.48 During the height of this prisoner boom, new
prison construction cost taxpayers around the country $6.7 billion.49
One scholar concluded, “overspending on incarceration is wasteful
both in terms of lost productivity of inmates and the additional

44. Id.
45. See STATE OF N.C. OFFICE OF STATE BUDGET & MGMT., CURRENT
OPERATIONS APPROPRIATION: PUBLIC SAFETY - ADULT CORRECTION - CANTEEN
FUND 8 (2017), https://files.nc.gov/ncosbm/documents/files/2017-19_Certified_190_
PublicSafety.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZYK8-ZKYV]. This sum was derived by adding prisonmanagement related costs.
46. Highlights of Final Budget by North Carolina Legislature, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (June 21, 2017, 5:43 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/north-carolina/
articles/2017-06-21/highlights-of-final-budget-by-north-carolina-legislature [https://perma.cc/
C3W7-FBV5 (staff-uploaded archive)].
47. David C. Leven, Curing America’s Addiction to Prisons, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
641, 643 (1993) (“In New York, there has been a 13% annual rate of increase since 1986,
absorbing much of the growth in state revenues.”).
48. See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 3. The past decades saw a plateauing, if not a
very minor decline, in prison populations. Id. at 11 fig.3.
49. Leven, supra note 47, at 643. The figure is from prison construction around the
country in 1989. Id.
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burden on taxpayers.”50 A surprisingly high number of nonviolent and
property crime offenders fill these prisons around the country.51
Incarceration follows a guilty verdict, meaning the state must
house, feed, and care for the convicted. The North Carolina
Department of Public Safety (“DPS”)-Prison Section was less certain
about the impact the law would have on prison populations.52 Using
the Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission’s estimated number
of 4,129 likely new convictions, the DPS-Prison Section provided a
range of estimates at 5%, 50%, and 100% conviction rates within the
eligible population.53 At a 5% conviction rate, the state would have to
provide sixty additional prison beds; at 50%, it would have to provide
603 additional beds; and at 100%, it would have to provide 1,205
additional beds.54 Assuming all these beds were in “[m]inimum
[c]ustody,” the total cost increase to prison expenditures in the lowest
scenario would be $1,865,460 per year, and at the upper end, it would
be $37,464,655.55
Finally, all Class H felons who receive an active prison sentence
are required to undergo nine months of post-release supervision by
the Department of Safety’s Community Corrections Section
(“CCS”).56 Offenders may also receive probation in lieu of active
sentences spent behind bars. During fiscal year 2010–2011, 62% of all
50. David S. Abrams, The Imprisoner’s Dilemma: A Cost-Benefit Approach to
Incarceration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 905, 969 (2013).
51. See, e.g., Leven, supra note 47, at 646 (noting that in the early 1990s, two-thirds of
New York’s prison population was made up of “property, drug or other nonviolent
crimes”). More recent studies support the proposition that this trend has not changed very
much in the new millennium. See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 9 fig.2. But see
INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE, supra note 36, at 5 (noting that a large percentage of
Class H felons receive “intermediate sentences,” meaning they will spend no time in
prison). Even though judges can give sentences other than active prison time, the costs for
those supervised periods of release will not be insignificant. See INCARCERATION FISCAL
NOTE, supra note 36, at 5.
52. See INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE, supra note 36, at 4 (citing, among other
reasons, an inability to determine if there were more convictions in each case from
multiple counties and an inability to accurately determine how many people charged with
Class 1 misdemeanors actually had more than seven prior convictions). The DPS used
seven predicate convictions rather than four; the early drafts of the bill originally required
seven previous misdemeanor larceny convictions. See, e.g., H.B. 54, 2011 Gen. Assemb.,
2011 Sess. (N.C. 2011) (as reported by H. Judiciary Subcomm. B, Feb. 9, 2011).
53. INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE, supra note 36, at 4.
54. Id.
55. See Cost of Corrections, N.C. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY, https://www.ncdps.gov/adultcorrections/cost-of-corrections [http://perma.cc/DMQ6-4KS4] (listing the cost of
“[m]inimum [c]ustody” as $31,091 per inmate per year). The totals calculated above
assume all the newly required beds would be required for the full year.
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1368.2(a) (2017); INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE, supra
note 36, at 5.
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Class H felony offenders received either an intermediate sentence,
such as probation,57 or a community punishment, such as house
arrest.58 These punishments must be supervised by state personnel,
which comes at a cost of $3.57 per offender, per day.59 Therefore, an
additional twelve months of intermediate or community punishment
costs the state $1303 per year.60 At the 5% conviction rate of the
eligible population, this was estimated to cost the state $169,421 in the
first year of the law’s implementation; at the 100% rate, it would have
cost the state $3,395,826.61
Combining these estimated financial costs, the new law was
predicted to cost North Carolina taxpayers anywhere between
$3,422,225 and $44,260,129 during the first year of implementation,
with the line item for housing more inmates over longer periods as
the most expensive variable.62 Though the costs represent only a
fraction of the state’s $1.2 billion prison budget, they are significant
enough for taxpayers to demand that the benefits justify the costs.
C.

The Cost to Society: Perpetuating Disparate Impacts

Beyond direct financial costs associated with trying,
incarcerating, and probating felons, there are third-order effects that
also create a heavy burden for society.63 One of the most insidious
effects of increased incarceration is the disproportionate impact the
trend has on minority populations.64 At the outset, it is important to
note that this Comment makes no assertion, implicit or otherwise,
that the passage of North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor larceny
statute was racially motivated. Still, it is a new criminal statute, and its
disparate impact cannot be ignored. Indeed, so immense has the
disparity in the impact of criminal law become that the United States
now imprisons more of its minorities than South Africa did at the
height of apartheid.65 In Washington, D.C., young, poor African
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.11(6) (2017).
58. Id. § 15A-1343(a1); INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE, supra note 36, at 5.
59. INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE, supra note 36, at 5.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 41, 55, 61.
63. But see Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395, 397 n.14 (1997) (“One study concluded that the cost to society of
not incarcerating a career criminal is approximately $430,000 per year—based on annual
cost of $25,000 per year for incarceration of a convicted felon, the study surmised that
society pays $405,000 more than the cost of imprisonment.”).
64. Leven, supra note 47, at 644–45.
65. MICHELE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 6 (rev. ed. 2012); see also Jon
Greenberg, Kristof: U.S. Imprisons Blacks at Rates Higher than South Africa During
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American males have a three-in-four chance of spending some time in
prison.66 Nationally, one in three young African American males will
spend time in prison, with the ratio as high as one in two for certain
large cities.67 Compare this to the fact that, nationally, only one in
thirty-four adults had some form of criminal record, many without
any accompanying jail time, at the end of 2011.68 Despite policy
initiatives and countless studies attempting to remedy the problem,
“race remains stitched into each and every stage of the criminal
justice system, so much so that one in three African American males
and one in six Latino males, compared to one in seventeen white
males, are expected to spend time in prison at some point in their
lives.”69 The disparate racial impacts of the criminal justice system
extend beyond imprisonment. For example, one study explored the
challenges that African Americans with criminal records face in
applying for jobs, whether or not employers run a background
check.70 In another study, researchers found when two “tester” job
applicants, one African American and one white, applied to jobs with
identical qualifications and criminal records, the African American
applicants had a significantly lower success rate.71
Race is not, however, the only basis upon which one can find
disparities in the effect of felony convictions.72 Any law comes with
some level of discretion; when that discretion can err on the side of
Apartheid, PUNDITFACT (Dec. 11, 2014, 5:10 PM), http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/
statements/2014/dec/11/nicholas-kristof/kristof-us-imprisons-blacks-rates-higher-south-afr/
[http://perma.cc/CMW7-2WQB] (“The U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that, in
2010, the incarceration rate for black men in all of the country’s jails and prisons was 4,347
people per 100,000. . . . The incarceration rate in South Africa in 1984 -- the midst of
apartheid -- was 440 persons imprisoned per 100,000 population. Blacks comprised around
94 percent of those incarcerated.”).
66. ALEXANDER, supra note 65, at 6–7.
67. Id. at 9.
68. Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 963, 964 (2013).
69. Id. at 968 (footnote omitted); see also PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIPHOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 33 (2009) (noting that going to prison has become a “rite of
passage” for many young, poor people).
70. HARRY J. HOLZER, STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A. STOLL, INST. FOR
RESEARCH ON POVERTY, WILL EMPLOYERS HIRE FORMER OFFENDERS?: EMPLOYER
PREFERENCES, BACKGROUND CHECKS, AND THEIR DETERMINANTS 29–31 (2002),
http://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/dps/pdfs/dp124302.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4GN-JTXY].
71. See DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA
OF MASS INCARCERATION 59, 68–70, 102 (2007).
72. See James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New
Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 31–32 (2012) (noting that the common denominator is
almost always “low-income” among the African American neighborhoods affected by the
criminal justice system).
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discrimination, it has traditionally discriminated along both racial and
economic lines.73 Crime and poverty have become so intertwined that
“[p]ublic defenders and other criminal justice actors are morphing
into service providers in response to the tight connection between
criminalization and their clients’ poverty.”74 It is for this reason that
some have started to decry the “criminalization of poverty” as the
state continues to “knit” poverty and criminality even closer
together.75
Though no statistics exist for convictions of minorities under
North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor larceny statute, it is likely
that punishment will fall most heavily on minorities and the poor, in
terms of both the rate of conviction and collateral consequences.
More felons in society also means more people who are either
unemployable or only employable at inadequate wages.76 These
individuals create a strain on society that governments must
ultimately address through more welfare programs—or more prison
time.
D. Felon Status: The Highest Cost, and Not Just to the Individual
It is the felon status, which follows an offender off prison
grounds, that comes with the greatest cost.77 Some may find the
73. See T. Markus Funk, Gun Control in America: A History of Discrimination
Against the Poor and Minorities, in GUNS IN AMERICA: A READER 390, 390 (Jan E.
Dizard et al. eds., 1999) (“One undeniable aspect of the history of gun control in the
United States has been the conception that the poor, especially the non-white poor,
cannot be trusted with firearms.”); Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2173, 2194 n.118 (2016) (discussing variations in the application of gun control laws);
Thomas B. McAffee, Setting Us Up for Disaster: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Terry v.
Ohio, 12 NEV. L.J. 609, 612, 625 (2012) (discussing Terry’s impact on the ability of the
police to discriminate on the basis of race and poverty).
74. Norrinda Brown Hayat, Section 8 Is the New N-Word: Policing Integration in the
Age of Black Mobility, 51 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 79 n.82 (2016) (quoting Alexandra
Natapoff, Gideon’s Servants and the Criminalization of Poverty, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
445, 446 (2015)).
75. Id.
76. Pinard, supra note 68, at 974; see BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND
INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 119 (2007) (“[M]en who have been incarcerated have
significantly lower wages, employment rates, and annual earnings than those who have
never been incarcerated.”); see also infra Section I.D.
77. Felon status has become such a discriminating burden that some have suggested
ex-felons should become a suspect class. See Ben Geiger, Comment, The Case for Treating
Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1191–92 (2006). This is because
[e]x-offenders are not just marginalized, they are also a clear example of repeat
losers in pluralist politics. Ex-offenders are often legally disenfranchised. In
addition, legislatures impose collateral consequences of conviction on exoffenders. Collateral consequences are statutes and regulations that inhibit ex-
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difficulties individuals face as felons unmoving, since it was the
individual who committed the felony crime in the first place. It is
reasonable to argue that those convicted of committing larceny five
times deserve the harsh penalties that come with felon status. But it is
hard to argue that someone who commits five petty crimes is
deserving of a lifelong sentence as a second-class citizen. The
punishment, in this case, would not appear to fit the crime.
Felons face many well-documented disadvantages as they try to
reintegrate into society. In fact, some have argued that it is the
“prison label” following a former offender that does more harm than
the actual time spent in prison.78 Criminal records can have long-term
impacts and follow offenders for years.79 Offenders “constantly
confront questions about their criminal records on every
application—from applications for welfare or for a job at a fast food
restaurant, to a volunteer position at the SPCA, and even a box on
the application to join a PTA.”80 Finding housing and employment
become immense challenges.81 The rights to vote, serve on a jury,
obtain student loans, and receive welfare benefits are also precluded
by a felony conviction.82
1. Housing Problems
Finding housing is a serious obstacle for a convicted felon.
Moreover, if an offender is unable to secure housing due to a felony
record, he is less likely to “move past” his interactions with the
criminal justice system.83 Indeed, one public housing advocate
painfully observed that, when it comes to housing, “[n]o one’s in more
need than ex-offenders.”84 Under current federal law, public housing
authorities have broad discretion to exclude felons from public

offenders’ productive re-entry into society. These statutes testify to ex-offenders’
lack of political organization. Furthermore, both ex-offenders’ legal
disenfranchisement and their de facto political powerlessness are systemic
problems. Under current equal protection doctrine, however, ex-offenders receive
judicial protection from government prejudice in name only.
Id. at 1191.
78. ALEXANDER, supra note 65, at 14.
79. Pinard, supra note 68, at 964–67.
80. Corinne A. Carey, No Second Chance: People with Criminal Records Denied
Access to Public Housing, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 545, 552 (2005) (discussing the discretion
public housing authorities have in judging the criminal records of tenants).
81. Pinard, supra note 68, at 966–67.
82. Forman, supra note 72, at 28–29.
83. Pinard, supra note 68, at 967.
84. Carey, supra note 80, at 552.
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housing.85 North Carolina housing law allows housing authorities to
summarily evict tenants for “criminal activity that threatens the
health and safety of others or the peaceful enjoyment of the premises
by others.”86 Though landlords may evict tenants for any criminal
activity, a felony conviction is far more likely to yield negative results
than a misdemeanor conviction. As an example of a felony
conviction’s potency, one website advising individuals seeking public
housing assistance lists the following caveat in its guide to obtaining
public housing: “[A] person with an arrest record, but no conviction,
has a greater chance of qualifying over someone who has been
convicted of their offense. Furthermore, felons face much greater
difficulty in qualifying, especially if it was a violence or drug related
sentence.”87 Without access to such housing, it is very unlikely a
felony offender will be able to find other affordable housing.
2. Employment Problems
The housing obstacle is exacerbated by the fact that felons also
have a more difficult time finding employment. The effect of a
criminal record on employment opportunities “cannot be
overstated.”88 It is widely believed that stable employment is the
primary factor in preventing an offender from recidivating.89 Even if
an offender does find a job, research indicates that his earnings will be
15% to 25% lower than they would have otherwise been.90 Felon
status is often an obstacle to obtaining a professional license.91 For
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 13661(c) (2012); 24 C.F.R. § 982.553(a)(2)(ii) (2018). Public
housing agencies may deny applications for public housing if the
applicant or any member of the applicant’s household is or was, during a
reasonable time preceding the date when the applicant household would otherwise
be selected for admission, engaged in any drug-related or violent criminal activity
or other criminal activity which would adversely affect the health, safety, or right
to peaceful enjoyment of the premises.
§ 13661(c).
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 157-29(e) (2017).
87. How Do I Know if I’m Eligible for the Public Housing Program?, AFFORDABLE
HOUSING ONLINE, https://affordablehousingonline.com/guide/public-housing/am-I-eligible#
qualify [https://perma.cc/UR4T-34RN] (emphasis added).
88. Pinard, supra note 68, at 972.
89. Elena Saxonhouse, Note, Unequal Protection: Comparing Former Felons’
Challenges to Disenfranchisement and Employment Discrimination, 56 STAN. L. REV.
1597, 1611 (2004).
90. Kelly Lyn Mitchell, Reining in Collateral Consequences by Restoring the Effect of
Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1, 5 (2005).
91. See Bruce E. May, Real World Reflection: The Character Component of
Occupational Licensing Laws: A Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon’s Employment
Opportunities, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 187, 190–91 (1995).
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example, ex-felons face the challenge of satisfying the “good
character” requirements in many jurisdictions.92 Since a surprising
number of jobs now require licensing, inability to obtain a license is
yet another significant employment barrier.93
In 2013, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) estimated that
over 38,000 statutes attach “collateral consequences” to criminal
offenses; of these statutes, almost 80% of them relate to
employment.94 In North Carolina alone, the ABA’s website identifies
963 provisions attaching civil consequences to criminal offenses, with
many of the provisions applying only to felony convictions.95 As noted
above, the difficulty ex-felons face in finding well-paying jobs
inevitably leads many back to offending yet again.96
Felons also have a harder time clearing their criminal records
under clemency and expunction provisions. Some states offer
“certificate of relief” programs; these programs allow offenders to
apply for a certificate of rehabilitation, issued by the state, that
removes many of the statutory barriers standing between offenders
and benefits and employment.97 The earlier an offender can apply for
a certificate, the sooner he can obtain it and, hopefully, move past his
crime.98 Multiple felony convictions have a far more negative impact
on when an offender can apply for the certificate than do
misdemeanor convictions.99 These types of remedies can restore rights
to vote, hold public office, and prevent the loss of licensure.100 North
Carolina allows ex-felons to apply for a “certificate of relief” that can
alleviate many of the collateral consequences following felon status.101
This certificate of relief, however, cannot be granted to a person with
92. See id. at 200–01.
93. Sara Sternberg Greene, A Theory of Poverty: Legal Immobility, WASH. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2019) (noting that the number of occupations requiring a license has
increased from 4.5% to about 29% since the 1950s).
94. Pinard, supra note 68, at 974.
95. Search Results from JUSTICE CENTER-THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/ [https://perma.cc/C6VL-9JYU (staff-uploaded archive)]
(listing collateral consequences compiled from the General Statutes of North Carolina, the
North Carolina Administrative Code, and other state sources).
96. Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry,
45 B.C. L. REV. 255, 259 (2004) (“The ex-offender population has tended to recidivate due
in part to an unavailability of economic and social supports. The majority of ex-offenders
released from prison reoffend.”).
97. Joy Radice, Administering Justice: Removing Statutory Barriers to Reentry, 83 U.
COLO. L. REV. 715, 721–24 (2012).
98. Id. at 728.
99. Id. at 727.
100. Id. at 728, 755.
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-173.2(a) (2017).
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prior misdemeanor convictions in addition to the felony from which
the petitioner seeks relief.102
3. Voting Problems
Finally, felon disenfranchisement affects the outcomes of
elections, causing a significant impact to society at large and ex-felons
in particular. Felon disenfranchisement changes electoral outcomes
by denying a voice to many of its citizens.103 Felon status, as a
percentage of the voting-age population, has risen from about 1% to
2.3% as of 2002.104 These are the very people who might have valid
reasons to vote for politicians who favor creating fewer felons; their
disenfranchisement presents the possibility of a self-building electoral
cycle where criminal justice reforms are often ignored.105
In North Carolina, a person is not allowed to vote if he is
“adjudged guilty of a felony against this State or the United States, or
adjudged guilty of a felony in another state . . . unless that person shall
be first restored to the rights of citizenship in the manner prescribed
by law.”106 By statute, all citizenship rights should be automatically
returned immediately upon the offender’s discharge from prison,
though clerical errors and voter confusion undoubtedly hinder the
statute’s automatic restoration of rights.107 As has been seen in recent
electoral cycles, errors in transmission occur and sometimes
erroneously bar past felony offenders from voting.108 Recently, a
North Carolina district attorney brought indictments against ex-felons
who voted before clearing probation and parole.109 Though it remains
102. Id.
103. Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Political Consequences of Felon
Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 792 (2002).
104. Id. at 782 fig.1.
105. See id. at 783 fig.2.
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163A-841(a)(2) (2017).
107. Id. § 13-1(1).
108. The author volunteered during the 2016 election by answering phones for a voting
rights hotline. Several of the questions fielded that day involved ex-felons being told by
polling officials that they were unable to vote, even though the voters had completed their
sentences and probations. As an example of the types of clerical errors that can occur, see
On Election Day, Stay Away, ECONOMIST, Aug. 11, 2018, at 31–32.
109. Lynn Bonner, Felony Charges of Illegal Voting Dismissed for Five NC Residents,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/
politics-government/article216584335.html [https://perma.cc/VR3K-QWEP] (noting that
the charges were dismissed pursuant to Alford pleas to lesser charges). For another
example of the legally fraught environment facing ex-felon voters, see Travis Fain, Federal
Subpoenas Demand ‘Tsunami’ of NC Voter Records, WRAL (Sept. 5, 2018),
https://www.wral.com/federal-subpoenas-demand-tsunami-of-nc-voter-records/17821061/
[https://perma.cc/GB6R-DWCX] (stating that the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District
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to be seen if these acts were honest misunderstandings or intentional
acts, what is certain is that such news will make ex-felons think twice
before heading to the polls.
E.

The Sum Total of Creating More Felons

The creation of more felons costs North Carolina a lot of money,
a lot of time, and a lot of societal progress. It must be acknowledged
that any criminal record, whether a dropped charge, misdemeanor, or
felony, poses problems for offenders.110 These problems are
compounded by the fact that employers, landlords, and others are
increasingly able to access all criminal records.111 Although a
misdemeanor record undoubtedly poses problems, a felony record
creates still greater obstacles. More felons mean more people who
cannot find work, cannot find housing, and cannot fully participate in
society. Though North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor larceny
statute will only add a percentage to the staggering total, any addition
to such a burden should come with justifying benefits.
II. THE “JUICE”: THE VALUE THE LAW PROVIDES
One would hope that the costs associated with North Carolina’s
habitual misdemeanor larceny statute are justified by some
proportional benefit. Opponents often raise incapacitation arguments
in support of longer sentences, but these assertions carry less weight
when discussing lower-level felonies with shorter prison terms. One of
the primary benefits proponents claim is that such a recidivist statute
deters future crimes.112
of North Carolina sought a large quantity of voting records to investigate possible illegal
voting).
110. Pinard, supra note 68, at 969. See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85
S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2012) (examining the disproportionate and unexpected high costs
that come with misdemeanor convictions). Though misdemeanor convictions come with
baggage, that baggage is heavier with a felony conviction. See supra Section I.D.
111. Pinard, supra note 68, at 970; see also Natapoff, supra note 110, at 1325
(“[C]riminal records are easily accessible to employers . . . .”).
112. Indeed, most policymakers focus on deterrence and incapacitation when they craft
criminal laws. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications
for Criminal Law & Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 42 (2007) (“Perhaps more
importantly, the engine driving American crime politics is not people’s intuitions of
justice. On the contrary, it is antidesert crime control theories—most notably deterrence
and incapacitation—that have had the greatest influence in recent criminal justice
reforms.”). This Comment will not explore any retributivist arguments for harsher
sentencing in recidivist crimes. These arguments do exist and are valid points within the
debate, but they are also difficult to quantify as factors in the balance between cost and
benefit. For a brief discussion of the retributivist motivations behind longer prison
sentences for recidivists in the Three Strikes context, see Vitiello, supra note 63, at 425–27
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There are two categories of deterrence that are important when
discussing longer prison sentences: general and specific. “General
deterrence is the reduction in crime that occurs due to the expectation
of punishment; longer sentences yield lower crime rates.”113 Specific
deterrence, on the other hand, applies only to an individual who has
already been caught, punished, and released—“[s]pecific deterrence is
the impact that the experience of incarceration has on subsequent
offending.”114 Extensive scholarship has focused on the deterrent
effect of longer prison sentences. After so much research, it appears
the deterrent effect of longer prison sentences is minimal at best,
perhaps even nonexistent, and possibly counterproductive.115
Policies seeking to use harsher punishment to deter crime are
widespread; one of the best-known, studied, and challenged examples
is California’s experiment with its “Three Strikes” law. This part will
begin by examining Three Strikes before taking a closer look at the
possible general and specific deterrence of longer sentences in the
larceny context.116 After concluding that the general and specific
deterrent effects are both minimal when dealing with petty property
crimes, it will then examine the possible counterproductive effects of
longer prison sentences, effects commonly classified as
“criminogenic.” After acknowledging the “benefits” other than the

(concluding, ultimately, that punishments under Three Strikes do not qualify as
retributivist at all).
113. Abrams, supra note 50, at 916.
114. Id. at 917.
115. See Shawn D. Bushway & Emily G. Owens, Framing Punishment: Incarceration,
Recommended Sentences, & Recidivism, 56 J.L. & ECON. 301, 305 (2013) (noting that there
was no “clear consensus” on the measuring of specific deterrence despite the large body of
academic work on the issue).
116. Incapacitation, the removal of a repeat offender from the community, is another
possible benefit with recidivist statutes. In the context of habitual misdemeanor larceny,
however, the incapacitation argument is less persuasive since the actual sentence length
may vary. See Welty, supra note 20, at 1950 (discussing prosecutors’ reluctance to use new
laws to their full extent); see also State v. Brice, 247 N.C. App. 766, 768, 786 S.E.2d 812,
814 (2016) (discussing the sentence for a habitual misdemeanor larceny offender that was
suspended for all but seventy-five days), rev’d on other grounds, 370 N.C. 244, 806 S.E.2d
32 (2017). The result in Brice is not an uncommon outcome for those charged with
habitual misdemeanor larceny. With such relatively short prison sentences, incapacitation
can only bring so much benefit. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, No. COA17-971, 2018 N.C.
App. LEXIS 272, at *1–2 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2018) (discussing a 100-day active
sentence). But see State v. Glidewell, __ N.C. App. __, __, 804 S.E.2d 228, 231 (2017)
(affirming the trial court’s imposition of an eleven to twenty-three months active
sentence). As Glidewell indicates, some trial courts are willing to impose felony-length
prison sentences. Still, even if the defendant in Glidewell served the maximum amount of
time (an unlikely prospect), the amount of time he would be removed from the
community would still not be that great when compared to other, more serious felonies.
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deterrence of future crime, this part ultimately concludes that longer
prison sentences come with few benefits at best; at worst, more prison
time actually creates more problems.
A. Did Three Strikes Deter Crime?
North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor larceny statute came
into existence without a clear underlying basis for the increase in
punishment for repeat larcenists.117 Nonetheless, a possible
justification for the law is a general notion that harsher punishment
for repeated offenses deters crime. A famous example is California’s
recidivist Three Strikes law. Though politically popular when enacted,
the law’s effectiveness in deterring crime is questionable.118 More
importantly, Three Strikes was not crime-specific, and, therefore, it
should have little bearing on the potential of North Carolina’s
habitual misdemeanor larceny statute. In short, proponents of North
Carolina’s statute should not look to California’s Three Strikes
statute for its justification.
In March of 1994, California passed its Three Strikes law,119
which required “25-years-to-life sentences for offenders with two
prior serious or violent felony convictions who are convicted of a
third felony, whether or not the third felony is serious or violent.”120
In the first year under Three Strikes, California’s crime rate fell 4.9%,
while the national average dropped only 2%; in the first six months of
the second year under Three Strikes, the crime rate in California fell
even faster at 7% as compared to 1% for the rest of the nation.121 At a
quick glance, it appears that Three Strikes was effective in reducing
crime.
Notably, however, California’s crime rates had started to fall
several years before the enactment of Three Strikes.122 Even though
California’s crime rates fell faster than many other states, this decline
was consistent with the broader national decline in violent crime
117. See supra Section I.A.
118. See Vitiello, supra note 63, at 409–12.
119. Act of Mar. 7, 1994, ch. 12, § 1(a)(1), 1994 Cal. Stat. 71, 72 (codified as amended at
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 2018)) (“[A]ny person convicted of a serious felony who
previously has been convicted of a serious felony . . . shall receive, in addition to the
sentence imposed by the court for the present offense, a five-year enhancement for each
such prior conviction on charges brought and tried separately.”).
120. Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Did “Three Strikes” Cause the Recent Drop
in California Crime? An Analysis of the California Attorney General’s Report, 32 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 101, 101 (1998).
121. Vitiello, supra note 63, at 441.
122. Beres & Griffith, supra note 120, at 107.
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among urban youth populations, who were not likely to be implicated
by Three Strikes due to their youth and relatively limited criminal
record.123 Indeed, cities where this demographic was heavily
concentrated dropped at rates similar to those in other large cities,
which was possibly attributable to a good economy rather than
harsher criminal sentencing laws.124 This makes sense because
California’s economy started to boom around the same time as the
enactment of Three Strikes, with crime rates falling and rising in
unison with unemployment.125 Thus, it would be misleading to rely on
Three Strikes for support of North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor
larceny statute without considering economic trends.
Reliance on Three Strikes becomes increasingly problematic
when examining its effect on property crime rates. Like violent
felonies, crime rates for theft fell by greater percentages among young
groups than it did among older groups.126 However, violent crime
rates decreased more than nonviolent crime rates.127 This statistic is
particularly suspect considering Three Strikes punishment should
deter crimes that originally imposed shorter prison sentences. Other
studies praising Three Strikes in some contexts still found that second
and third strike deterrence of larceny was not only nonexistent but
larceny rates actually “significantly” increased by 17,700 cases.128 One
possible explanation for this increase in larceny is its attractiveness as
a “nonstrikeable offense,”129 but such an explanation imputes a level
of rationality to criminal acts that other research does not support.130
Whatever the reason, it seems clear that larceny was not deterred
under California’s Three Strikes law.131

123. Id. at 127.
124. Id. at 118, 127–29. The three most violent cities were located in states with two- or
three-strike laws. See Vitiello, supra note 63, at 441 n.263.
125. Beres & Griffith, supra note 120, at 127–29.
126. Id. at 121–22. Though theft did not qualify as a “strikeable” offense, the penalty
for subsequent theft can still be greatly enhanced by the Three Strikes law. Still, theft rates
among younger offenders also declined at rates higher than those of older offenders. Id.
127. Id. at 122.
128. Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of
California’s Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 159 (2002). “For
rape, larceny, and auto theft, the coefficients on the two-strikes sentencing variable are
positive but insignificant. The impact of three-strikes sentences on murder, robbery, and
burglary is negative and significant. In contrast, the impact of three-strikes sentences on
larceny is positive and significant.” Id. at 185.
129. Id. at 175.
130. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 36–37 (discussing whether knowledge of possible
prison sentences deters crime).
131. See Shepherd, supra note 128, at 190.
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California’s Three Strikes is limited, at best, in predicting the
effectiveness of North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor larceny
statute. First, crime rates among younger persons declined at the
greatest rates. Unemployment was also falling during Three Strikes’
initial years, something that likely affected, if it did not in fact cause,
the drop in crime rates. Second, as California’s crime rates fell, so did
the rest of the nation’s, though at generally lower rates. Finally, Three
Strikes did not appear to deter larceny and other “nonstrikeable”
offenses, that is offenses that did not qualify as “strikes.” This fact
alone makes the study of Three Strikes admittedly limited in its
assessment of longer prison sentences’ effect on larceny.
B.

The Deterrent Effect of Felony Punishment on Misdemeanor and
Property Crimes

One of the most interesting findings of Three Strikes research is
the law’s limited effect on property crimes. As one author
hypothesized, this might have been due to the appeal of crimes that
did not fall within the law’s purview.132 But it is also possible that
property crimes and misdemeanors are different, and that the
deterrent effect of a longer punishment varies among different
crimes.133 Not all crimes are created equal; what deters a murderer
may not deter a shoplifter.134 Perhaps because of these differences,
laws that seek to deter larceny have faced sharp skepticism from legal
scholars.135

132. See id.
133. See George Antunes & A. Lee Hunt, The Deterrent Impact of Criminal Sanctions:
Some Implications for Criminal Justice Policy, 51 J. URB. L. 145, 153 n.23 (1973). Antunes
and Hunt compared their findings to an earlier study. The research sought to examine the
effect of the severity of punishment with the certainty of punishment. Antunes and Hunt
found that larceny was negatively impacted (that is, there was a reduction in crime rates)
by certainty of punishment, but the severity of punishment had such a slight effect as to
not merit classification as “negative.” Of all the variables researched, the severity of the
punishment was found to be the weakest predictor of crime reduction. Id. at 154.
134. Xiaogang Deng, The Deterrent Effects of Initial Sanction on First-Time
Apprehended Shoplifters, 41 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 284,
285 (1997). But see Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A
Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 173–74 (2004)
(arguing that changes to existing criminal laws to allocate greater criminal liability have no
deterrence effect whatsoever).
135. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 431 (1974) (“[The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule] is not
supposed to ‘deter’ in the fashion of the law of larceny, for example, by threatening
punishment to him who steals a television set—a theory of deterrence, by the way, whose
lack of empirical justification makes the exclusionary rule look as solid by comparison as
the law of gravity.”).
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North Carolina passed its habitual misdemeanor larceny statute
in 2011, and the law took effect in 2012. A review of larceny rates in
the state shows steady declines in the rate of larceny from 2013 to
2016.136 Larceny rates had already been falling, however, at
comparable rates prior to the law’s passage, with the largest drop in
the past ten years coming in the period between 2008 and 2009.137
Moreover, the deterrent effect on the specific types of larceny
covered by the misdemeanor recidivist statute is questionable.
Shoplifting, a crime that often involves amounts below $1000, is a
good example. In the year immediately after passage of the law, 2012
to 2013, the rate of shoplifting actually increased, as did the value of
goods stolen through shoplifting.138 From 2013 to 2014, the number of
shoplifting cases then decreased slightly.139 Though statistics can be
interpreted in many ways, one conclusion is inescapable: larceny
statistics do not support a causal connection between the passage of a
habitual misdemeanor larceny statute and a decrease in larceny rates.
The ineffectiveness of longer sentences for petty crimes of
larceny is not a surprising result given the probable ineffectiveness of
longer sentences as a solution to property crime. Since longer
sentences are both expensive and, at best, mildly effective at deterring
petty property crime, a cost-benefit analysis reveals that incarceration
for minor property crimes is inefficient. As one researcher explained,
“[s]imply put, incarcerating someone for stealing a $1000 laptop is not
very cost-effective.”140 The same researcher thus recommended policy
changes that use other means to attempt to punish and deter such
crimes.141 Such an approach comports with other findings that indicate
the almost total absence of deterrent effect from tweaking criminal
sanctions within existing laws.142
136. N.C. STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN NORTH CAROLINA - 2016,
tbl.9 (2017), http://crimereporting.ncsbi.gov/Reports.aspx [https://perma.cc/5UK2-9MHZ
(staff-uploaded archive)].
137. Id.
138. N.C. STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LARCENY BY STOLEN VALUE AND
DISTRIBUTION:
2012–2013
(2014),
http://crimereporting.ncsbi.gov/Reports.aspx
[https://perma.cc/C2CV-HT5Q (staff-uploaded archive)].
139. N.C. STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LARCENY BY STOLEN VALUE AND
DISTRIBUTION:
2013–2014
(2015),
http://crimereporting.ncsbi.gov/Reports.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9NFY-WVDY (staff-uploaded archive)].
140. Abrams, supra note 50, at 966.
141. See id. (exploring the idea of reclassifying crimes and noting that California has
already made such changes with positive initial results).
142. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949,
951 (2003) (“The general existence of the system may well deter prohibited conduct, but
the formulation of criminal law rules within the system, according to a deterrence-
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Maybe what matters more in the context of misdemeanors (and
probably felonies too) is the likelihood of getting caught, not the
length of the punishment.143 Larger police forces and misdemeanor
arrests likely deter larceny not because of incapacitation, since jail
time in such situations is negligible,144 but because the chance of
apprehension is all the more likely. Though deterrence is difficult to
analyze, research does tend to promote the idea that certainty of
punishment is more important than its severity.145 For example, one
study focused on the punishment of probationers who violated the
terms of their probation.146 The research compared two enforcement
practices. The first was the practice of allowing the probationer to
commit multiple violations before sending the offender back to
prison. The second was the use of “swift and certain” punishment by
probation officers, even if the punishment did not include immediate
revocation of the offender’s probation.147 Researchers found that the
use of “swift and certain” enforcement was far more effective than
“the threat of more severe punishment occurring at some point in the
future.”148 Similarly, another important component that is often
overlooked is the length of time it takes for the punishment to
arrive.149 Because felony trials take longer than misdemeanor trials
and include juries, delaying punishment may serve to dilute the threat
of an increased sentence.
Since it is likely that certainty matters more than the severity,
larceny is a crime where the use of longer sentences is even less likely
to matter. Larceny’s close counterpart, shoplifting, is notoriously
underreported and difficult to enforce, meaning the greater certainty
optimizing analysis, may have a limited effect or even no effect beyond what the system’s
broad deterrent warning has already achieved.”).
143. See Hope Corman & Naci Mocan, Carrots, Sticks, and Broken Windows, 48 J.L. &
ECON. 235, 262 (2005) (noting that the size of the police force had an effect only on the
crimes of motor vehicle theft and grand larceny and that misdemeanor arrests also had a
deterrent effect on grand larceny); see also Deng, supra note 134, at 285 (noting that the
embarrassing, public nature of an arrest following a shoplifter’s first time getting caught is
one of the best ways to prevent shoplifting recidivism).
144. Corman & Mocan, supra note 143, at 251.
145. Vitiello, supra note 63, at 441. This argument was made 200 years ago by early
criminal scholar Cesare Beccaria. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 58
(Henry Paolucci trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1963) (1764).
146. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 35 (examining “inmates ‘scores’ that determined
parole eligibility based on risk of recidivism”).
147. Id. at 37.
148. Id.; see also Robinson & Darley, supra note 134, at 174.
149. Robinson & Darley, supra note 134, at 193 (“[F]inding that the effects of
punishment in deterring behaviour drop off rapidly as the delay increases between the
transgressive response and the administration of punishment for that response.”).
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is that punishment will not occur.150 As for larceny itself, in one
Department of Justice study from the mid-1980s, larceny was listed as
one of the most underreported crimes.151 If a crime is not reported, it
is not likely to be punished. If it is not likely to be punished,
mandating a longer prison sentence for when it is occasionally
punished cannot do much good.
Not only is punishment less certain because the crime is
underreported, it is also less certain because offenders may not have
adequate notice about the new law. The offender who consistently
commits misdemeanor larceny knows his behavior is illegal, but that
does not mean he knows his behavior becomes “more illegal” on the
fifth conviction.152 This raises another important question: how can
the law deter if the offender does not know his behavior faces more
severe sanction? Whatever advantages a larceny “frequent flyer” may
have in the realm of notice, “the most that can be said is that many
North Carolina residents may be ignorant of much of the state’s
criminal law, and that a simpler and more compact criminal code
might be easier to remember and to follow.”153 A study by North
Carolina economist David Anderson would seem to confirm this
sentiment. After conducting interviews with inmates, Anderson found
150. See Michael Corkery, They’re Falsely Accused of Shoplifting, but Retailers
Demand Penalties, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/17/
business/falsely-accused-of-shoplifting-but-retailers-demand-they-pay.html [https://perma.cc/
77YJ-MRAN (dark archive)] (“Shoplifting is an intractable problem for retailers, costing
stores more than $17 billion a year, according to an industry estimate.”). Though a distinct
crime, acts of shoplifting can usually be charged as acts of larceny, meaning the pervasive
nature of shoplifting is, in actuality, the pervasive nature of larceny. Compare N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-72 (2017) (“Larceny of property; receiving stolen goods or possessing stolen
goods.”), with id. § 14-72.1 (“Concealment of merchandise in mercantile establishments.”).
One of the cases with which the author assisted involved an act of “larceny” from a major
retailer, a crime that could have easily been punished as shoplifting.
151. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, REPORTING CRIMES TO THE POLICE 1 (1985), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/rcp.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9PS-MNSJ] (noting that larceny was one of the most
underreported crimes in 1983).
152. See Dru Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 1535, 1553 (2005) (“Universal ignorance of the law, however, appears
to be almost complete, except for the most rudimentary notions of what is illegal and hazy
ideas about what some of the details might be. In a recent study of educated citizens in
four different states, the results confirmed the hypothesis that ‘people do not have a clue
about what the laws of their states hold on . . . important legal issues.’”). Of course, a
repeat larceny offender would have the added advantage of being warned by counsel or
the judge at his previous trials that a more severe charge awaited him after his fifth
offense, but there is nothing to say that a judge or lawyer must so inform a defendant.
153. Welty, supra note 20, at 1959; see also Robinson & Darley, supra note 134, at 176–
77 (noting that even those who offend, and thus have the greatest motive to know the law,
rarely understand or comprehend the law’s consequences).
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“that only 22 percent knew beforehand what the punishment would
be for their crime while more than half did not know or even consider
the punishment.”154 As Anderson’s findings suggest, even knowledge
that greater penalties await future offense does not mean the
offenders will change their behavior.155 Ignorance of the law is, of
course, no excuse, but policymakers would do well to consider this
ignorance when adjusting the criminal code.
C.

The Possible Backlash of Longer Sentences

As the previous section shows, even if severe punishment does
eventually arrive, it is not clear whether it does a very good job of
deterring future criminal behavior. One Justice Department study
found that prison stays between six and thirty months had no effect
on recidivism.156 Another study found that, among juveniles, prison
sentences ranging from three to thirteen months did not affect rearrest rates.157 In addition to these ambiguous results, longer prison
sentences for relatively low-level offenders can actually increase
criminality.
A long stay in prison for misdemeanor property crimes may have
no deterrent effect on the prisoner at all. As it turns out, prison may
actually increase the likelihood that larceny offenders recidivate upon
release.158 While short prison sentences have been shown to provide
specific deterrence, prison sentences over twelve months have been
shown to increase the likelihood of recidivism.159 Another study found
that each additional month of time up to twenty months deterred
future criminal conduct, but beyond twenty months the effect was
negligible.160
A possible part of the explanation for this increased recidivism
rate is an inmate’s “criminal capital formation.”161 This is the
development of criminal skills that makes an inmate a more effective
criminal upon release.162 Since this potential “criminogenic” effect is
more potent for lower-level offenders, the larceny offender may do
154. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 36–37.
155. Id. at 37 (citing a study that found minor offenders who were about to turn
eighteen still planned on committing the same number and type of crimes after they
became legal adults and would be subject to harsher sanctions).
156. Id. at 36.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 35.
160. Id.
161. Abrams, supra note 50, at 917.
162. Id.
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more than steal when he leaves prison: he may move on to more
serious, violent offenses.163
D. Are There Benefits Other than Deterrence?
Though this Comment weighs deterrence as a justification for
longer prison sentences, there are other arguments to be made in
support of North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor larceny statute.
Retributivists may argue that someone who steals five times, no
matter the value of the property stolen, simply deserves punishment
as a felon. While this sentiment is a politically acceptable reason to
implement a new law, it seems that whatever societal catharsis is
gained through the law still comes at too high a cost.
Others may argue that incapacitation of recidivists also makes
the law worthwhile. But an incapacitation argument falters on three
grounds. First, habitual misdemeanor larceny is unlikely to result in
lengthy prison sentences.164 This means that those charged with
habitual misdemeanor larceny will not be off the streets for very long.
Second, the incapacitation still comes at a great cost to the state,165
one that should be required to show results in the form of reduced
property crime commensurate or greater than the amount of money
spent incapacitating repeat offenders. Given the cost of implementing
the law, these justifying benefits seem unlikely to materialize. Third,
locking up older, more experienced offenders may not be the best use
of the state’s prison resources.166 It is younger offenders who pose the
greatest risk to society.167 But it is the older, more experienced
offender who gets the longer sentence, taking up jail resources long
after he has “aged out of crime.”168 Both retributivist and
incapacitation arguments in favor of North Carolina’s habitual
misdemeanor larceny statute are valid, but they are not persuasive
when the meager benefits are weighed against the substantial costs.

163. See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 21–22 (“Once individuals enter prison, they
are surrounded by other prisoners who have often committed more serious or violent
offenses.”).
164. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
165. See INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE, supra note 36, at 5; Cost of Corrections,
supra note 55.
166. See Vitiello, supra note 63, at 443.
167. Id. at 442–43.
168. Id. at 443; see also AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 35 (pointing out that as
criminals get older, they become less likely to commit new offenses); Abrams, supra note
50, at 916 (“[C]rime is a young-man’s game.”).
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Little, if Any, Juice from a Felony Sentence for Misdemeanor
Larceny

Definitive studies on the effect of harsher punishment and
deterrence are hard to find.169 By examining the broad field of
literature, however, it is possible to draw a few conclusions. First, the
deterrent effect, if any, is small,170 especially as it relates to
misdemeanor larceny. Second, exogenous factors other than sentence
length play an important role in crime rates and recidivism,171 though
that role is not perfectly understood. Third, it is very possible that
longer sentences may increase both the likelihood of recidivism and
the violence of the subsequent acts committed by misdemeanor
larceny offenders.172 Finally, any additional “benefits” beyond
deterrence are also unlikely to justify the cost of creating more felons
from those accused of misdemeanor property crimes.173 There may be
some juice, but there is not much. Quite simply, any benefit is likely
negated by the criminogenic effects of longer sentences.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO FELON STATUS FOR MISDEMEANOR
LARCENY OFFENDERS
Given the dim prospects for deterrence of misdemeanor larceny
through the use of felony convictions and sentences, it is worth
exploring other options that could both prevent future offenses and
make victims of larceny whole. Not only are these options potentially
more effective but they are also cheaper in terms of dollars and
societal costs.
One positive aspect of North Carolina’s habitual misdemeanor
larceny statute is that judges have some discretion in determining the
offender’s sentence, though there may still be mandatory minimums
169. Vitiello, supra note 63, at 441 (“Deterrence arguments are notoriously difficult to
assess, in large part because society is not set up to allow carefully controlled
experiments.”).
170. The most sanguine assessment the author found concluded the following:
[A]nalyses generally agree that increased incarceration rates have some effect on
reducing crime, but the scope of that impact is limited: a 10 percent increase in
incarceration is associated with a 2 to 4 percent drop in crime. Moreover, analysts
are nearly unanimous in their conclusion that continued growth in incarceration
will prevent considerably fewer, if any, crimes . . . .
Don Stemen, Reconsidering Incarceration: New Directions for Reducing Crime, 19 FED.
SENT’G REP. 221, 221 (2007).
171. See Beres & Griffith, supra note 120, at 128.
172. See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 35–36.
173. See supra Section II.D.

97 N.C. L. REV. 432 (2019)

460

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

based on the offender’s previous criminal record.174 For example,
assume an offender being tried under the habitual misdemeanor
larceny statute has only his four prior larceny convictions. Each of
these convictions is a Class 1 misdemeanor,175 each worth one point.
With four points, this offender is a “level II” offender.176 A level II
offender charged with a Class H felony has a presumptive minimum
sentence of six to eight months, a sentence that can be served as an
intermediate sentence or wholly active.177 “Intermediate punishment
is supervised probation plus at least one of six specific conditions of
probation (special probation, residential program, electronic house
arrest, intensive supervision, day reporting center, and drug treatment
court).”178 As of 2011, 44% of all felony sentences were intermediate,
with intensive supervision and special probation serving as the
preferred conditions.179 For some reason, however, habitual
misdemeanor larceny offenders appear to be given active sentences
far more often than intermediate sentences.180
The sentence length can also be reduced to four to six months if
mitigating factors can be shown.181 To get into this mitigated range,
however, the offender must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that a mitigating factor exists; ultimately, the decision to
move a sentence into a mitigated range is at the discretion of the
court. In 2016, it only happened a quarter of the time.182 Though some
discretion does exist, there is still a good chance that a defendant is
going to spend some amount of time behind bars. More important
than the existence or length of the prison sentence, however, is the

174. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72(a) (2017); id. § 15A-1340.14(b)(5) (requiring that
each previous Class 1 misdemeanor count as one point towards criminal history points); id.
§ 15A-1340.17(c); Leven, supra note 47, at 656 (noting the often “irrational” way that
mandatory minimum sentences punish offenders).
175. § 14-72(a).
176. Id. § 15A-1340.17(c).
177. Id.; see also Jamie Markham, Community Punishment and Intermediate
Punishment, N.C. CRIM. L. (Oct. 12, 2011, 7:45 AM), https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/
community-punishment-and-intermediate-punishment/ [https://perma.cc/76TS-6BKK].
178. Markham, supra note 177.
179. Id.
180. REBECCA DIAL, JOHN KING & JENNIFER WESOLOSKI, N.C. SENTENCING &
POLICY ADVISORY COMM’N, STRUCTURED SENTENCING STATISTICAL REPORT FOR
FELONIES AND MISDEMEANORS: FISCAL YEAR 2017, app. D tbl.1 (2018),
https://www.nccourts.gov/assets/documents/publications/statisticalrpt_fy16-17.pdf?JF1Sijg
QJ6lX7N9ZTOuG.ztHfioBwrrV [https://perma.cc/N2DF-3FXA].
181. § 15A-1340.17(c).
182. Id. § 15A-1340.16(a); DIAL ET AL., supra note 180, at app. D tbl.2.
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“felon” label that follows the offender after they leave prison; the
judge has no power over that label.183
If a punishment must be enforced, it might be better to use
probation and community service alternatives to prison.184 A study
found that such measures were more effective than prison in
preventing recidivism, especially for property crimes.185 Probation
supervision costs the state $3.57 per day per offender, as opposed to
the minimum incarceration cost of $85.18 per inmate per day,
meaning the more effective remedy is also the more cost-friendly
option.186 These programs are especially effective if used early in an
offender’s career; at that age, the “dollar-for-dollar” return is much
higher than longer incarceration periods.187 Indeed, one study found
that a “Shoplifter School” helped dramatically reduce the chance
first-time shoplifters would recidivate.188
Paying restitution directly to the harmed party is another
effective way to remedy wrongs and prevent recidivism.189 Such an
approach helps to shift “the paradigm” of criminal punishment from
one of the offender against the state to one of the offender against the
victim.190 Such a paradigm shift “would emphasize the future” rather
than focus on the past, giving victims a greater voice and a chance to
come to terms with an uncomfortable past experience.191 These
programs have taken the form of a mediation exercise between the
offender and the victim and reached success rates as high as 95%

183. See supra Section I.D.
184. Of course, probation is not without its critics and problems. See, e.g., Fiona
Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of Recidivism, 104
GEO. L.J. 291, 296 (2016) (discussing the broad-reaching conditions of probation and the
need for their examination). Despite these valid concerns, however, such programs seem
preferable to longer prison sentences and certainly preferable to felon status.
185. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 22.
186. INCARCERATION FISCAL NOTE, supra note 36, at 5; Cost of Corrections, supra
note 55.
187. Vitiello, supra note 63, at 449 n.317 (citing a study that found “dollar for dollar,
programs that encourage young people to stay in school and out of trouble prevent five
times as many crimes as stiff penalties imposed on repeat offenders using three-strikesand-out laws”); see also Beres & Griffith, supra note 120, at 119–20 (citing a study, the
authors noted that the programs “offered modest cash and scholarship incentives to
encourage disadvantaged youth to graduate from high school” and that these “incentives
were several times more effective than Three Strikes, per dollar spent, in preventing
serious crime”).
188. Deng, supra note 134, at 289.
189. See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 23 (noting that restitution may be especially
appropriate for property crimes).
190. Leven, supra note 47, at 651–52.
191. Id. at 652 (emphasis omitted).
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resolution, a success rate that includes the resolution of non-violent
crimes.192
A final option includes the expansion of expungement for exfelons. Expunction is not a perfect solution; though a person’s record
may be cleared, it is also never perfectly cleared.193 The North
Carolina Justice Center describes expunctions this way:
In North Carolina, an expunction is the destruction of a
criminal record by court order. An expunction (also called an
“expungement”) of a criminal record restores the individual, in
the view of the law, to the status he or she occupied before the
criminal record existed. With rare exception, when an
individual is granted an expunction, he or she may truthfully
and without committing perjury or false statement deny or
refuse to acknowledge that the criminal incident occurred.194
North Carolina’s expunction laws allow the expunction of a Class
H felony conviction; however, each relevant provision requires that
the petitioner not have any prior misdemeanor or felony charges.195
Since habitual misdemeanor larceny requires all four previous
misdemeanors, the expunction laws are no help to convicted habitual
offenders. Even if these laws could be applied to habitual
misdemeanor larceny, the waiting period of ten years under section
15A-145.5(c)196 would still leave the offender exposed to the
hardships of ex-felon status as it pertains to housing, employment,
and other recidivism-preventing factors. Unless the expunction law
were to be changed to permit expunction of recidivist statutes (a
scenario that seems highly unlikely),197 however, this point is moot.

192. Id. at 652–53.
193. See Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for
Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 1471, 1520–21 (“In sum, expunction is an example of ‘legislative and judicial bodies
finding compelling policy reasons for ignoring in law what has occurred in fact . . . .’”
(quoting Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226, 1243 (1976))).
194. C. DANIEL BOWES, N.C. JUSTICE CTR., SUMMARY OF NORTH CAROLINA
EXPUNCTIONS 2017 1 (2017), https://www.ncjustice.org/sites/default/files/Summary%
20of%20NC%20Expunctions%202017_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/87BD-N9PJ].
195. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-145.4(c), -145.5(c) (2017).
196. Id. § 15A-145.5(a)–(c).
197. See Resnik, supra note 193, at 1520 (“At other times, expunction is predicated on
a desire to protect an individual from suffering the consequences of government
misconduct. Expunction is sometimes an artifact of commitment to rehabilitation, and
when interest in that goal of the criminal justice system wanes, so does legislative
authorization of expunction.”). Since a recidivist is viewed as a recurring problem by the
legislature, it is unlikely there would be much motivation to expand expunction laws for
their benefit.
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For those charged with habitual misdemeanor larceny, it is the
felon label that poses the greatest threat to their long-term recovery
and well-being.198 Since prison sentences are light compared to other
felonies, especially in practice, solutions that avoid the greatest costs
will include removing the felon label at the outset or providing for its
removal through expunction or certificate of relief programs.
CONCLUSION
In its habitual misdemeanor larceny statute, North Carolina’s
legislature created a law with a lot of squeeze and little juice. Because
of the high costs to both the state and defendants, it is reasonable to
demand that the law yield notable, positive results. Longer sentences
have, at best, a negligible impact on misdemeanor larceny rates; at
worst, a longer sentence may actually increase the likelihood of
recidivism. These results come with a high price tag in terms of
dollars, societal burdens, and individual prosperity. Alternatives such
as the use of probation and community education programs,
mediation and restitution options, and broadened expungement
opportunities all are likely more effective, cost less, and provide more
positive results. Still, the highest costs are tied to the felon label that
follows repeat petty offenders. Probationary programs will not
remove this felon label, meaning the state should seriously consider
whether such a punishment is appropriate for those guilty of minor
crimes. With such high costs related to imposing longer sentences and
creating more felons, North Carolina should seriously consider
replacing its habitual misdemeanor larceny statute with one or more
of these alternative measures. If North Carolina does, then it may be
able to get a lot more juice with a lot less squeeze.
WILLIAM O. WALKER**

198. See supra Section I.D.
** Special thanks are due to: the board and staff of the North Carolina Law Review,
especially Thomas Zamadics, without whom this piece would have been less than it
became; to the world-class professors at UNC Law, especially Professor Jain, whose
writing seminar provided invaluable insight for this Comment; to the selfless public
defenders at the Wake County and Federal Public Defender (E.D.N.C.) offices whose
examples have inspired me; and, most importantly, to my wife, Claire, for her love,
support, and constant reassurance. The Comment’s deficiencies are, of course, my own.

